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Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of the Firm: 
Any Gains from Trade? 
 
 
 
Abstract:  Though they developed in isolation, the theory of entrepreneurship and 
the economic theory of the firm can be usefully integrated.  In particular, the concept 
of entrepreneurship as judgment associated with Knight (1921) and some Austrian 
school economists aligns naturally with the theory of the firm.  Because judgment 
cannot be purchased on the market, the entrepreneur needs a firm — a set of alien-
able assets he controls — to carry out his function.  We show how this notion of judg-
ment illuminates key themes in the modern theory of the firm (existence, boundaries, 
and internal organization).  In our approach, resource uses are not data, but are cre-
ated as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce final goods.  The 
entrepreneur’s problem is aggravated by the fact that capital assets are heterogene-
ous. Asset ownership allows the entrepreneur to experiment with novel combina-
tions of heterogeneous assets. The boundaries of the firm, as well as aspects of inter-
nal organization, may also be understood as responses to entrepreneurial processes 
of experimentation.   
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Introduction 
Do entrepreneurs need business firms to carry out their function?  Are business firms 
run by entrepreneurs, or by hired managers?  Economists have been thinking and 
writing about entrepreneurship since at least the 18th century.  Within the last few 
decades, the theory of the firm has become one of the fastest growing areas in ap-
plied microeconomics.  And yet, surprisingly, the above questions have rarely been 
asked.  The modern economic theory of the firm virtually ignores entrepreneurship, 
while the literature on entrepreneurship in economics and strategic management has 
limited use for the economic theory of the firm.1 
This lack of contact between two fields that seem to overlap so naturally re-
sults partly from the development of economic thought.  The economic theory of the 
firm emerged and took shape as the entrepreneur was being banished from micro-
economic analysis, first in the 1930s when the firm was subsumed into neoclassical 
price theory (O’Brien 1984), and then in the 1980s as the theory of the firm was re-
formulated in the language of game theory and the economics of information.  The 
gradual “hardening” of the neoclassical approach in economics, including the main-
stream approach to the theory of the firm, left, little room for the entrepreneurship; 
Baumol (1993b: 17) calls it “the specter which haunts economic models.”  In modern 
contributions to the theory of the firm (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992; Hart, 1995) reference to entrepreneurship is passing at best.  These ap-
proaches are largely static and “closed,” meaning that they focus on solutions to 
given optimization problems, avoiding questions about the origin of the problem at 
hand, or indeed of the firm itself.  Agency theory, for example, has generated impor-
tant insights on the effects of incentives on effort and the relationship between incen-
tive pay and risk.  In explaining how a principal gets an agent to do something, how-
ever, the theory overlooks the more fundamental question of what the principal 
should want the agent to do, or indeed, how the principal got to be a principal in the 
first place. 
We argue that the theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm can be 
usefully integrated.  We begin by surveying various approaches to entrepreneurship 
in the economics literature, asking to what extent the entrepreneur needs a firm (a set 
of alienable assets he controls) to carry out his function (“Does the Entrepreneur Need a 
Firm?”).  We conclude that only the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment has a di-
rect and natural link to the theory of the firm.  Because judgment cannot be pur-
chased on the market, the entrepreneur needs a firm — a set of alienable assets he 
controls — to carry out his function.   Next, we review briefly the main themes in the 
modern theory of the firm (existence, boundaries, and internal organization) and 
                                                 
1 The terms “entrepreneur” and “entrepreneurship” do not even appear in the indexes of leading texts 
on the economics of organization and management such as Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman (2004) or 
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer (2004). Two British surveys of economics principles text-
books (Kent, 1989; Kent and Rushing, 1999) confirm a similar absence of the concept. 
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show how the notion of entrepreneurship as judgment illuminates these issues in 
novel ways (“Putting Entrepreneurship into the Theory of the Firm: Judgment and Eco-
nomic Organization”).  To develop a judgment-based approach to economic organiza-
tion, we also draw on ideas from Austrian economics (Mises 1949; Kirzner 1973; 
Salerno 1993) — the body of economics that is perhaps most intimately connected to 
ideas on entrepreneurship — and on property rights economics (Hart 1995; Barzel 
1997), an important part of modern organizational economics.  In our approach, re-
source uses are not data, but are created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using 
assets to produce goods.  The entrepreneur’s decision problem is aggravated by the 
fact that capital assets are heterogeneous, and it is not immediately obvious how they 
should be combined. Asset ownership allows the entrepreneur to experiment with 
novel combinations of heterogeneous assets.   
A number of unconventional insights emerge from this approach.  First, we 
argue that the existence of the firm may be understood in terms of limits to the mar-
ket for judgments about how to combine heterogeneous assets to meet future wants.  
Second, we argue that the boundaries of the firm, as well as aspects of internal or-
ganization, may be understood as responses to entrepreneurial processes of experi-
mentation.  In this connection, we introduce a distinction between productive and 
destructive entrepreneurship and argue that it is useful for understanding the inter-
nal organization of the firm.   
 
 
Does the Entrepreneur Need a Firm?  
The Firm and the Entrepreneur in Economics 
Because entrepreneurs in many ways personify market forces, one might expect 
them to be the central figures in economics. Similarly, because most entrepreneurial 
ventures somehow involve a firm, entrepreneurship in the context of firm organization 
would seem to be a central subject in the theory of markets.  While some classical 
economists, particularly Jean-Baptiste Say and Jeremy Bentham, reasoned this way, it is 
hardly characteristic of modern economics. 2  As the historian of economic thought Paul 
McNulty (1984: 240) puts it:  
The perfection of the concept of competition . . . which was at the heart of 
the development of economics as a science during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, led on the one hand to an increasingly rigorous 
                                                 
2 As Machovec (1995: 109) notes, to the classical economists “specialization and commercial freedom 
spawned opportunities for alert individuals.”  Unlike later economists, the classical economists held 
what is essentially a process view in which competition was seen “as a tapestry of aggressive com-
mercial behaviors which created pure profits by speculating on price futures, engineering new meth-
ods of production, and inspiring new product lines to better serve consumers” (ibid.: 136).  This is not 
true of Adam Smith, however; Schumpeter (1949: 65) writes that “the leading or directing activity as a 
distinctive function played a surprisingly small role in [Smith’s] analytic scheme of the economic proc-
ess.”  
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analytical treatment of market processes and on the other hand to an in-
creasingly passive role for the firm.  
The “increasingly rigorous analytical treatment” of markets, notably in the 
form of general equilibrium theory, not only made firms increasingly “passive,” it 
also made the model of the firm increasingly stylized and anonymous, doing away 
with those dynamic aspects of markets that are most closely related to entrepreneur-
ship (O’Brien 1984).  In particular, the development of what came to be known as the 
“production function view” (Williamson, 1985; Langlois and Foss 1999) — roughly, 
the firm as it is presented in intermediate microeconomics textbooks with its fully 
transparent production possibility sets — was a deathblow to the theory of entrepre-
neurship in the context of firm organization.  If any firm can do what any other firm 
does (Demsetz 1991), if all firms are always on their production possibility frontiers, 
and if firms always make optimal choices of input combinations and output levels, 
then there is no room for entrepreneurship.  
As this has been the dominant view of the firm in economics at least since the 
1930s, it is not surprising that much of the important work on the economics of en-
trepreneurship was done prior to this period (e.g., Schumpeter), and that more recent 
work by economists on entrepreneurship has been done largely outside of the con-
fines of mainstream economics (e.g., Kirzner).  However, as we argue later, advances 
in economics over the last two to three decades have left economics somewhat better 
equipped to deal with entrepreneurship and to incorporate it into models of firm 
organization.   
Our approach below is to ask if the entrepreneur needs a firm, and if so, 
whether firm and industry structure affect what entrepreneurs do.  The answers are 
not obvious.  Some approaches to entrepreneurship — Schumpeter’s concept of the 
entrepreneur as innovator, for instance — treat the entrepreneur as an uncaused 
cause, a pure genius who operates outside the usual constraints imposed by resource 
owners and other market participants and is thus unaffected by the firm.  Other ap-
proaches treat entrepreneurs as skilled managers, exercising their entrepreneurial 
talents through skillful arrangements of productive factors, thus being an integral 
part of the firm’s operation.3 
Concepts of Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship as management. In the entrepreneurship curriculum of 
many business schools, the phenomenon under investigation has often been “small-
business management.”4  Entrepreneurs are pictured as the managers of small, fam-
ily-owned businesses or start-up companies. Entrepreneurship consists of routine 
management tasks, relationships with venture capitalists and other sources of exter-
nal finance, product development, marketing, and so on.  In this sense, entrepreneur-
                                                 
3 On the history of the entrepreneurship concept in economic theory, see Elkjaer (1991) and Ibrahim 
and Vyakarnam (2003). 
4  However, this appears to be slowly changing towards a more generic and theoretically based under-
standing of entrepreneurship.  
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ship and the theory of the firm — the theory of some firms, at least — are inextricably 
linked.  The theory of entrepreneurship in this approach is the theory of how small 
business owners organize and manage their assets.  
Unfortunately, this notion of entrepreneurship is sufficiently elastic to be prac-
tically meaningless.  It appears to include virtually all aspects of small or new busi-
ness management, while excluding the identical tasks when performed within a large 
or established business.  Put differently, if entrepreneurship is simply a set of man-
agement activities, or any management activity that takes place with in a particular 
type of firm, then it is unclear why we should bother to add this label to those activi-
ties.   
Entrepreneurship as imagination or creativity. It is common, particularly 
within the management literature, to associate entrepreneurship with boldness, dar-
ing, imagination, or creativity (Begley and Boyd, 1987; Chandler and Jansen, 1992; 
Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993; Hood and Young, 1993; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  
These accounts emphasize the personal, psychological characteristics of the entre-
preneur. Entrepreneurship, in this conception, is not a necessary component of all 
human decision-making, but a specialized activity that some individuals are particu-
larly well equipped to perform.5 
If these characteristics are the essence of entrepreneurship, then entrepreneur-
ship has no obvious link to the theory of the firm (at least not without further argu-
ments).  The relevant personal characteristics can presumably be acquired by con-
tract on the market by purchasing consulting services, project management, and the 
like.  A “non-entrepreneurial” owner or manager, in other words, can manage the 
day-to-day operations of the firm, purchasing entrepreneurial services on the market 
as needed.  Moreover, the literature does not explain clearly whether imagination 
and creativity are necessary, sufficient, or incidental conditions for entrepreneurship.  
Clearly the founders of many firms are imaginative and creative.  If not, are they not 
entrepreneurs? 
Entrepreneurship as innovation. Probably the best-known concept of entre-
preneurship in economics is Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of the entrepreneur as innova-
tor.  Schumpeter’s entrepreneur introduces “new combinations”— new products, 
production methods, markets, sources of supply, or industrial combinations — shak-
ing the economy out of its previous equilibrium through a process Schumpeter 
termed “creative destruction.”  The entrepreneur-innovator is introduced in Schum-
peter’s ground-breaking Theory of Economic Development (1911) and developed further 
in his two-volume work, Business Cycles (1939).  Realizing that the entrepreneur has 
no place in the general-equilibrium system of Walras, whom Schumpeter greatly 
                                                 
5 As Gartner (1988: 21) argues, however, this literature employs a host of different (and frequently) 
contradictory notions of entrepreneurship. A “startling number of traits and characteristics have been 
attributed to the entrepreneur, and a ‘psychological profile’ of the entrepreneur assembled from these 
studies would portray someone larger than life, full of contradictions, and, conversely, someone so 
full of traits that (s)he would have to be a sort of generic ‘Everyman.’” 
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admired, Schumpeter gave the entrepreneur a role as the source of economic 
change.6  “[I]n capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not 
[price] competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the 
new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization . . . competi-
tion which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at 
the margins of profits and the outputs of existing firms but at their foundations and 
their very lives” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 84). 
Schumpeter carefully distinguished the entrepreneur from the capitalist (and 
strongly criticized the neoclassical economists for confusing the two).  His entrepre-
neur need not own capital, or even work within the confines of a business firm at all.  
While the entrepreneur could be a manager or owner of a firm, he is more likely to be 
an independent contractor or craftsman.  In Schumpeter’s conception, “people act as 
entrepreneurs only when they actually carry out new combinations, and lose the 
character of entrepreneurs as soon as they have built up their business, after which 
they settle down to running it as other people run their businesses” (Ekelund and 
Hébert, 1990: 569). 
This suggests a rather tenuous relationship between the entrepreneur and the 
firm he owns, works for, or contracts with.  Entrepreneurship is exercised within the 
firm when new products, processes, or strategies are introduced, but not otherwise.  
The day-to-day operations of the firm need not involve entrepreneurship at all.  
Moreover, because Schumpeterian entrepreneurship is sui generis, independent of its 
environment, the nature and structure of the firm does not affect the level of entre-
preneurship.  Corporate R&D budgets, along with organizational structures that en-
courage managerial commitment to innovation (Hitt and Hoskisson, 1994), have little 
to do with Schumpeterian entrepreneurship per se.7  
Entrepreneurship as alertness or discovery. Entrepreneurship can also be con-
ceived as “alertness” to profit opportunities. While present in Cantillon’s and J. B. 
Clark’s notions of entrepreneurship, this concept has been elaborated most fully by 
Israel Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1992). Kirzner follows Hayek (1968) in describing competi-
tion as a discovery process:  the source of entrepreneurial profit is superior foresight 
— the discovery of something (new products, cost-saving technology) unknown to 
other market participants.  The simplest case is that of the arbitrageur, who discovers 
a discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a more 
typical case, the entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production 
process and steps in to fill this market gap before others. Success, in this view, comes 
not from following a well-specified maximization problem, but from having some 
                                                 
6 This includes, but is not limited to, the formation of new business ventures.  
7 Other writers influenced by Schumpeter, however, such as Baumol (1993a), do view public and pri-
vate R&D, the scale and scope of patent protection, and basic science education as important determi-
nants of the level of entrepreneurial activity.  
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knowledge or insight that no one else has — that is, from something beyond the 
given optimization framework.8 
Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do not own capital; they need only be alert to profit 
opportunities.  Because they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty.  Critics have 
seized on this as a defect in Kirzner’s conception.  According to this criticism, mere 
alertness to a profit opportunity is not sufficient for earning profits. To reap financial 
gain, the entrepreneur must invest resources to realize the discovered profit oppor-
tunity.  “Entrepreneurial ideas without money are mere parlor games until the 
money is obtained and committed to the projects” (Rothbard, 1985: 283).  Moreover, 
excepting the few cases where buying low and selling high are nearly instantaneous 
(say, electronic trading of currencies or commodity futures), even arbitrage transac-
tions require some time to complete.  The selling price may fall before the arbitrageur 
has made his sale, and thus even the pure arbitrageur faces some probability of loss.  
In Kirzner’s formulation, the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the failure 
to discover an existing profit opportunity.  Entrepreneurs either earn profits or break 
even, but it is unclear how they suffer losses. 
For these reasons, the link between Kirznerian entrepreneurship and the the-
ory of the firm is weak.  Owners, managers, employees, and independent contractors 
can all be alert to new profit opportunities; Kirzner’s entrepreneur does not need a 
firm to exercise his function in the economy.   
Entrepreneurship as charismatic leadership.  Another strand of literature, in-
corporating insights from economics, psychology, and sociology and leaning heavily 
on Max Weber, associates entrepreneurship with charismatic leadership.  Entrepre-
neurs, in this view, specialize in communication — the ability to articulate a plan, a 
set of rules, or a broader vision, and impose it on others.  Casson (2000) calls these 
plans “mental models” of reality.  The successful entrepreneur excels at communicat-
ing these models to others, who come to share the entrepreneur’s vision (and become 
his followers).  Such entrepreneurs are also typically optimistic, self-confident, and 
enthusiastic (though it is not clear whether these are necessary conditions). 
Witt (1998a, 1998b) describes entrepreneurship as “cognitive leadership.”  He 
outlines an entrepreneurial theory of the firm that combines recent literature on cog-
nitive psychology with Kirzner’s concept of alertness.  Entrepreneurs require com-
plementary factors of production, he argues, which are coordinated within the firm.  
For the firm to be successful, the entrepreneur must establish a tacit, shared frame-
work of goals, which governs the relationships among members of the entrepre-
neur’s team.  As Langlois (1998) points out, it is often easier (less costly) for individu-
als to commit to a specific individual, the leader, rather than an abstract set of com-
                                                 
8 Kirzner’s view of superior foresight differs from Stigler’s concept of search in which the value of new 
knowledge is known in advance, available to anyone willing to pay the relevant search costs. “Stigler's 
searcher decides how much time it is worth spending rummaging through dusty attics and untidy 
drawers looking for a sketch which (the family recalls) Aunt Enid thought might be by Lautrec.  
Kirzner’s entrepreneur enters a house and glances lazily at the pictures which have been hanging in 
the same place for years. ‘Isn't that a Lautrec on the wall?’” (Ricketts, 1987: 58). 
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plex rules governing the firm’s operations.  The appropriate exercise of charismatic 
authority, then, reduces coordination costs within organizations. 
A possible weakness of this approach, in our view, is its emphasis on human 
assets, rather than the inalienable physical assets the entrepreneur controls.  Must the 
charismatic leader necessarily own physical capital, or can he be an employee or in-
dependent contractor?  Formulating a business plan, communicating a “corporate 
culture,” and the like are clearly important dimensions of business leadership.  But 
are they attributes of the successful manager or the successful entrepreneur?   Even if 
top-level managerial skill were the same as entrepreneurship, it is unclear why char-
ismatic leadership should be regarded as more “entrepreneurial” than other, com-
paratively mundane managerial tasks such as structuring incentives, limiting oppor-
tunism, administering rewards, and so on. 
Entrepreneurship as judgment.  An alternative to the foregoing accounts is that 
entrepreneurship consists of judgmental decision-making under conditions of uncer-
tainty.  Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making when the range of pos-
sible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is generally un-
known (what Knight [1921] terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk).  This 
view finds expression in the earliest known discussion of entrepreneurship, that 
found in Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature de commerce en géneral (1755). Cantillon 
argues that all market participants, with the exception of landowners and the nobil-
ity, can be classified as either entrepreneurs or wage earners:  
Entrepreneurs work for uncertain wages, so to speak, and all others for 
certain wages until they have them, although their functions and their 
rank are very disproportionate.  The General who has a salary, the 
Courtier who has a pension, and the Domestic who has wages, are in 
the latter class.  All the others are Entrepreneurs, whether they establish 
themselves with a capital to carry on their enterprise, or are Entrepre-
neurs of their own work without any capital, and they may be consid-
ered as living subject to uncertainty; even Beggars and Robbers are En-
trepreneurs of this class (Cantillon, 1755: 54). 
Bearing risk—that is, making decisions under conditions of uncertainty—is the en-
trepreneur’s raison d’être. 
Judgment is distinct from boldness, innovation, alertness, and leadership. 
Judgment must be exercised in mundane circumstances, for ongoing operations as 
well as new ventures. While alertness tends to be passive (perhaps even hard to dis-
tinguish from luck [Demsetz, 1983]), judgment is active.  Entrepreneurs “are those 
who seek to profit by actively promoting adjustment to change.  They are not content 
to passively adjust their . . . activities to readily foreseeable changes or changes that 
have already occurred in their circumstances; rather, they regard change itself as an 
opportunity to meliorate their own conditions and aggressively attempt to anticipate 
and exploit it” (Salerno, 1993: 123).  Those who specialize in judgmental decision-
making may be dynamic, charismatic leaders, but they need not possess these traits.  
  9
Decision making under uncertainty is entrepreneurial, whether it involves imagina-
tion, creativity, leadership, and related factors or not. 9 
Entrepreneurial Judgment as a Natural Complement to the Theory of the Firm 
While the view of entrepreneurship as judgment appears in many writers, it is 
most often associated with Knight (1921).  For Knight, firm organization, profit, and 
the entrepreneur are closely related.  In his view, these arise as an embodiment, a 
result, and a cause, respectively, of commercial experimentation (Demsetz, 1988).10   
Knight introduces the notion of judgment to link profit and the firm to the exis-
tence of uncertainty.  Judgment primarily refers to the process of businessmen forming 
estimates of future events in situations in which there is no agreement or idea at all on 
probabilities of occurrence.  Judgment is learned and tends to have a large tacit compo-
nent.  Entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its 
marginal product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage.11  This is particularly 
because entrepreneurship is judgment about the most uncertain events, such as starting 
a new firm, defining a new market, and the like.  
In other words, there is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, 
so exercising judgment requires the person with judgment to start a firm.  Judgment 
thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision-making is ultimately decision-
making about the employment of resources.  An entrepreneur without capital goods is, 
in Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur.12  This implies an obvious link with the theory of 
                                                 
9 Mises (1949) introduces entrepreneurship to explain profit and loss. In the marginal productivity 
theory of distribution, laborers earn wages, capitalists earn interest, and owners of specific factors earn 
rents. Any excess (deficit) of a firm’s realized receipts over these factor payments constitutes profit 
(loss). Profit and loss, therefore, are returns to entrepreneurship. In a hypothetical equilibrium without 
uncertainty (what Mises calls the “evenly rotating economy”), capitalists would still earn interest, as a 
reward for lending, but there would be no profit or loss. 
10 Knight explains that “[w]ith uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect 
knowledge, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control 
of productive activities . . . Its existence in the world is a direct result of the fact of uncertainty” (1921: 267, 
271).   
11  “The receipt of profit in a particular case may be argued to be the result of superior judgment. But it 
is judgment of judgment, especially one's own judgment, and in an individual case there is no way of 
telling good judgment from good luck and a succession of cases sufficient to evaluate the judgment or 
determine its probable value transforms the profit into a wage. . . . If . . . capacities were known, the 
compensation for exercising them can be competitively imputed and is a wage; only, in so far as they 
are unknown or known only to the possessor himself, do they give rise to a profit” (Knight, 1921: 311). 
12 Carl Menger’s (1871) treatment of production gives the entrepreneur a similar role.  Production 
requires an “act of will” and “supervision of the execution of the production plan.” These functions 
“entail property ownership and, therefore, mark the Mengerian entrepreneur as a capitalist–
entrepreneur” (Salerno, 1998: 30). Menger describes “command of the services of capital” as a “neces-
sary prerequisite” for economic activity. Even in large firms, although he may employ “several help-
ers,” the entrepreneur himself continues to bear uncertainty, perform economic calculation, and su-
pervise production, even if these functions “are ultimately confined . . . to determining the allocation 
of portions of wealth to particular productive purposes only by general categories, and to selection 
and control of persons” (Menger, 1871: 160–61).  
  10
the firm, particularly those (transaction cost and property rights theories) that define 
asset ownership as a crucial ingredient of firm organization (Williamson, 1996; Hart, 
1995).  The firm, in this sense, is the entrepreneur and the alienable assets he owns, 
and therefore ultimately controls.  The theory of the firm is essentially a theory of 
how the entrepreneur exercises his judgmental decision-making — what combina-
tions of assets will he seek to acquire, what (proximate) decisions will he delegate to 
subordinates, how will he provide incentives and employ monitoring to see that his 
assets are used consistently with his judgments, and so on.  
 
Putting Entrepreneurship into the Theory of the Firm:              
Judgment and Economic Organization 
At least some concepts of entrepreneurship, then, have implications for resource 
ownership, and thus for the formation and organization of firms.  How, though, is 
entrepreneurship best incorporated into the theory of the firm?  What role might the 
entrepreneur play in various economic approaches to the firm? 
Established Theories of the Firm 
The neoclassical theory of the firm. As noted earlier, the neoclassical theory of 
the firm that forms the basis of competitive general equilibrium (and some game-
theoretic) models has no place for the entrepreneur.  In economics textbooks, the 
“firm” is a production function or production possibilities set, a “black box” that 
transforms inputs into outputs.  The firm is modeled as a single actor, facing a series 
of decisions that are portrayed as uncomplicated: what level of output to produce, 
how much of each factor to hire, and the like.  These “decisions,” of course, are not 
really decisions at all; they are trivial mathematical calculations, implicit in the un-
derlying data.  In the long run, the firm may choose an optimal size and output mix, 
but even these are determined by the characteristics of the production function 
(economies of scale, scope, and sequence).  In short: the firm is a set of cost curves, 
and the “theory of the firm” is a calculus problem.  There is nothing for an entrepre-
neur to do. 
While descriptively vacuous, the production-function approach has the appeal 
of analytical tractability along with its elegant parallel to neoclassical consumer the-
ory (profit maximization is like utility maximization, isoquants are like indifference 
curves, and so on).  Nonetheless, many economists now see it as increasingly unsatis-
factory, as unable to account for a variety of real-world business practices: vertical 
and lateral integration, mergers, geographic and product-line diversification, fran-
chising, long-term commercial contracting, transfer pricing, research joint ventures, 
and many others.  The inadequacy of the traditional theory of the firm explains much 
of the recent interest in agency theory, transaction cost economics, the property-
rights approach, and other theories spawned by Coase’s landmark 1937 article, “The 
Nature of the Firm.” 
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The Coasian (contractual) framework. Coase (1937) introduced a fundamen-
tally new way to think about the firm.  Coase argued that in the world of neoclassical 
price theory, firms have no reason to exist.  Because we observe firms, he reasoned, 
there must be a “cost to using the price mechanism” (Coase 1937: 390).  Market ex-
change entails certain costs:  discovering the relevant prices, negotiating and enforc-
ing contracts, and so on.  Within the firm, the entrepreneur may be able to reduce 
these “transaction costs” by coordinating these activities himself.  However, internal 
organization brings other kinds of transaction costs, namely problems of information 
flow, incentives, monitoring, and performance evaluation.  The boundary of the firm, 
then, is determined by the tradeoff, at the margin, between the relative transaction 
costs of external and internal exchange.  In a single brief paper, Coase laid out the 
basic desiderata of the economic theory of the firm, namely accounting in a compara-
tive-institutional manner for the allocation of transactions across alternative govern-
ance structures.  Although terminology and specific insights may differ, most mod-
ern theories of the firm may be said to be Coasian in the sense that they adhere to this 
program.  But what of the entrepreneur in Coase’s thought?  
Coase’s position is ambiguous.13  Although he uses the term, his “entrepre-
neur” seems to be more engaged in the mechanical exercise of comparing the costs of 
organizing given transactions in given governance structures than in engaging in fu-
ture-oriented speculative acts (Boudreaux and Holcombe, 1991).  On the other hand, 
Coase stresses certain aspects of economic organization that are best understood in the 
context of entrepreneurial activities. Notably, his discussion of the employment con-
tract appeals to unpredictability and the need for qualitative coordination in a world 
of uncertainty (Langlois and Foss, 1999).  This provides ample room for the entrepre-
neur as a speculating and coordinating agent.  However, this potential was not ful-
filled, neither in Coase’s own thought, nor, as we shall see, in later post-Coasian con-
tribution to the economic theory of the firm.   
Modern organizational economics. The post-Coasian theory of the firm — or 
more generally, organizational economics — follows Coase in conceiving the firm as a 
contractual entity whose existence, boundaries, and internal organization can be ex-
plained in terms of economizing on (various types of) transaction costs.  This is not to 
say that any one theory in modern organizational economics has addressed all these 
three key issues in a unified framework incorporating the same kind of transaction 
costs.  Indeed, a possible perspective on the division of labor that exists within the 
modern theory of the firm is that while the principal-agent  approach (Holmström and 
Milgrom 1991) and team theory (Marschak and Radner, 1972) are mainly relevant for 
understanding internal organization, the transaction cost (Williamson 1985) and prop-
erty rights approaches (Hart 1995; Hart and Moore, 1990) are designed to explain firm 
boundaries.  
                                                 
13 Coase dismissed Knight’s (1921) explanation. It is arguable that he misunderstood Knight (Foss 
1996). 
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These approaches have stressed different kinds of transaction costs leading in 
different ways to contractual imperfection and therefore to economic outcomes infe-
rior to the full-information, zero-transaction-cost ideal.  For instance, principal-agent 
theory emphasizes the costs of monitoring contractual relationships in light of poten-
tial moral hazard.  The property rights approach emphasizes the costs of writing 
(complete) contracts.  The transaction cost approach also emphasizes contracting 
costs, but particularly the costs of adjusting to unanticipated contingencies.14 
Of the four approaches, only the transaction costs approach and the property 
rights approach are conventionally considered theories of the firm in the strict sense.  
Neither team theory nor principal-agent theory explains the boundaries of the firm, 
defined in terms of asset ownership (Hart, 1995).  Such an explanation must presup-
pose that contracts are incomplete; otherwise, everything can be stipulated contractu-
ally and there is no need for ownership, the “residual right” to make decisions under 
conditions not specified by contract.  Transaction cost economics and property rights 
theory, by contrast, assume that contracts are incomplete, meaning that some contin-
gencies or outcomes are not specified in the contract.    
Following Oliver Williamson (1985, 1996), organizational economics has 
placed particular emphasis on specific (or highly complementary) assets in explain-
ing the boundaries of the firm.15  Assets are said to be highly specific when their 
value in the present (best) use is much greater than their value in the second-best use.  
Investment in such assets exposes agents to a potential hazard:  once investments are 
made and contracts are signed, unanticipated changes in circumstances can give rise 
to costly renegotiation.  One party can threaten to pull out of the arrangement —
reducing the value of the specific assets — unless that party is allocated a greater 
share of the quasi-rents of joint production.  Fear of being “held up” in this way dis-
torts ex ante investment levels, reducing the joint surplus produced by the relation-
ship.  Quasi-rents can be safeguarded through vertical integration, where merger 
eliminates any adversarial interests.  Less extreme options include long-term con-
tracts, partial ownership, or agreements for both parties to invest in offsetting rela-
tionship-specific investments.  Overall, several governance structures may be em-
ployed.  According to transaction cost theory, parties tend to choose the governance 
structure that best controls the underinvestment problem, given the particulars of the 
relationship.   
In Hart’s (1995) formulation, integration does not eliminate opportunism, but 
rather changes the incentives to engage in opportunism.  By giving property rights to 
the (non-human) specific assets to the party whose ex ante investment most effects 
the joint surplus, the harmful effects of opportunism can be mitigated.  The key as-
sumption in this story is that contracts are left incomplete because (for instance) the 
transaction costs of drafting complete contracts are prohibitive. It is the need to make 
                                                 
14 This is a bit of a rational reconstruction on our part: Formal contract theorists, such as principal-
agent or property right theorists, are uncomfortable with the notion of “transaction cost.”   
15 For expository reasons, we here suppress the differences between Williamson’s and Hart’s versions 
of this story.  
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decisions under circumstances that are not covered by the contract that makes hold-
up and its consequences possible. 
Putting entrepreneurship into the modern theory of the firm.  The analytical 
apparatus of modern organizational economics offers many opportunities for incor-
porating concepts of entrepreneurship, particularly the notion of entrepreneurship as 
judgment.  For example, the emphasis on asset ownership as a crucial aspect of firm 
organization accords well with Knight’s (1921) views, as does the emphasis on in-
complete contracting.  Theories of decision-making under asymmetric information 
help illustrate what is distinctive about entrepreneurship, compared to other kinds of 
decision-making.  In many ways, however, the modern economics of organization 
retains the structure of the neoclassical theory of the firm it supplanted.  For exam-
ple, as capabilities theorists (Langlois and Foss, 1999) have pointed out, the modern 
economics of organization has merely grafted a super-structure of asymmetric in-
formation, transaction costs, and the like on top of the neoclassical theory of produc-
tion.  Moreover, the modern economics of organization is almost as deterministic and 
“closed” as the neoclassical theory of the firm:  while notions of uncertainty, igno-
rance, and surprise are occasionally invoked in the literature, they serve merely as 
rhetorical devices to justify the assumption that contracts are incomplete (Foss 2003). 
Such notions are not themselves explained, nor are they used to incorporate process 
and entrepreneurship.  Still, key insights from organizational economics and the con-
cept of entrepreneurial judgment may be usefully joined into a more complete theory 
of economic organization. 
In the following, we show how the view of entrepreneurship as judgment and 
can be put into organizational economics.  We address the three classical themes of 
the firm’s existence, boundaries, and internal organization.  Consistent with the view 
that entrepreneurship as judgment implies asset ownership, we start with a discus-
sion of capital heterogeneity.16 
Assets, Attributes, and Entrepreneurship 
The entrepreneur’s primary function is to choose among the various combina-
tions of inputs suitable for producing particular goods (and to decide whether these 
goods should be produced at all), based on current prices for the factors and ex-
pected future prices of the final goods (Knight 1921).17  If capital is a single “good,” 
with one price, then entrepreneurship is reduced to choosing between capital-
                                                 
16 For an attempt to ground this explicitly in Austrian capital theory, see Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein 
(2002). 
17 This formulation makes it clear that financiers — those who determine how much capital is avail-
able to each firm and each branch of industry — are also entrepreneurs.  In the traditional, produc-
tion-function theory of the firm, capital markets do little but supply financial capital to managers, who 
can get as much capital as they wish at the going market price. In a more sophisticated understanding, 
managers do not decide how much capital they want; capitalists decide where capital should be allo-
cated. In doing so, they provide essential discipline to the manager, who Mises (1949: 304) calls the 
entrepreneur’s “junior partner” (Klein, 1999). 
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intensive and labor-intensive production methods (or among types of labor).18    
Lachmann (1956: 13, 16), by contrast, stresses that real-world entrepreneurship con-
sists primarily of choosing among combinations of heterogeneous capital assets:  
We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combina-
tions . . . will be ever changing, will be dissolved and re-formed.  In this 
activity, we find the real function of the entrepreneur. 
[T]he entrepreneur’s function . . . is to specify and make decisions on the 
concrete form the capital resources shall have.  He specifies and modi-
fies the layout of his plant . . . As long as we disregard the heterogene-
ity of capital, the true function of the entrepreneur must also remain 
hidden.   
In other words, the entrepreneur’s decision problem is complicated by the heteroge-
neity of capital assets.   While it is common to view capital heterogeneity in terms of 
physical heterogeneity — beer barrels and blast furnaces are different because of their 
physical differences — an economic approach emphasizes that capital goods are het-
erogeneous because they have different levels and kinds of valued attributes (in the 
terminology of Barzel, 1997).  
Attributes. Attributes are characteristics, functions, possible uses of assets, 
etc., as perceived by an entrepreneur.  For example, a copying machine has multiple 
attributes because it can be used at different time, by different people, for different 
types of copying work; that it can be purchased in different colors and sizes; and so 
on.  Clearly, virtually all assets have multiple attributes.  Assets are heterogeneous to 
the extent that they have different, and different levels of, valued attributes.  Attrib-
utes may also vary over time, even for a particular asset.  In a world of “true” uncer-
tainty, entrepreneurs are unlikely to know all relevant attributes of all assets when 
production decisions are made.  Nor can the future attributes of an asset, as it is used 
in production, be forecast with certainty.19  Future attributes must be discovered, over 
time, as assets are used in production. Or, to formulate the problem slightly differ-
ently, future attributes are created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets 
to produce goods. 
                                                 
18 Moreover, in a world of homogenous capital assets (resources), economic organization would be 
relatively unimportant.  All capital assets possess the same attributes, and thus the costs of inspecting, 
measuring, and monitoring the attributes of productive assets is trivial.  Exchange markets for assets 
would be virtually devoid of transaction costs.  A few basic contractual problems — in particular, 
principal-agent conflicts over the supply of labor services — would remain, though workers would all 
use identical capital assets.  However, it is hard to see what role ownership of capital assets would 
play in this world.  If the costs of measuring and specifying attributes are low, entrepreneurs and fac-
tor owners could contract over attributes, and there would be little incentive to acquire ownership of 
assets themselves. Transactions involving such assets would be governed by complete, contingent 
contracts. Because contracts would substitute for ownership in a homogenous capital world, the 
boundaries of firms would be indeterminate (Hart 1995).  
19   This sense of uncertainty links naturally to the notion of contractual incompleteness.  We explore 
the implications of this idea below.  
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Ownership and entrepreneurship.  Focusing on attributes not only helps to il-
lustrate the concept of heterogeneous capital, but also illuminates the vast literature 
on property rights and ownership.  Barzel (1997) stresses that property rights are 
held over attributes, and property rights to known attributes are the relevant units of 
analysis in his work.  In contrast, he dismisses the notion of asset ownership as essen-
tially legal and extra-economic.  Similarly, Demsetz argues that the notion of “full 
private ownership” over assets is “vague,” and “must always remain so” because 
“there is an infinity of potential rights of actions that can be owned . . . It is impossi-
ble to describe the complete set of rights that are potentially ownable” (Demsetz 
1988: 19).   
 However, as we noted above, most assets have unspecified, not-yet-created or 
not-yet-discovered attributes, and an important function of entrepreneurship is to 
create or discover them.  Contrary to Demsetz, it is exactly this feature that creates a 
distinct role for asset ownership — that is, for acquiring legal title to a bundle of exist-
ing attributes as well as to future attributes.  Specifically, ownership is a low-cost 
means of allocating the rights to attributes of assets that are created or discovered by 
the entrepreneur-owner.  For instance, those who create or discover new knowledge 
have an incentive to use it directly because it is costly to transfer knowledge to others.   
In a well-functioning legal system, ownership of an asset normally implies that the 
courts will not interfere when an entrepreneur-owner captures the value of newly 
created or discovered attributes of an asset he owns.  Consequently, the entrepre-
neur-owner can usually avoid costly negotiation with those who are affected his 
creation or discovery.  This keeps the dissipation of value at bay.  Of course, asset 
ownership itself provides a powerful incentive to create or discover new attributes, 
as ownership conveys the legally recognized (and at least partly enforced) right to 
the income of an asset, including the right to income from new attributes.20  We next 
apply these ideas to the three classical issues in the theory of the firm: existence, 
boundaries, and internal organization.  
The Existence of the Firm 
 Incomplete markets for judgment.  Agents may realize rents from their human 
capital through three means:  (1) selling labor services on market conditions, (2) enter-
ing into employment contracts, or (3) starting a firm.  As Barzel (1987) argues, moral 
hazard implies that options (1) and (2) are often inefficient means of realizing rents.  In 
other words, entrepreneurs know themselves to be good risks but are unable to com-
municate this to the market.  For this reason, firms may emerge because the person 
whose services are the most difficult to measure (and therefore are most susceptible to 
moral hazard and adverse selection) becomes an entrepreneur, employing and super-
                                                 
20  Moreover, ownership simplifies the process of entrepreneurial arbitrage (Kirzner, 1973)—and hence 
helps to close pockets of ignorance in the market—by allowing entrepreneurs to acquire, in one trans-
action, a bundle of rights to attributes (i.e., a distinct asset). This means that the parties need not en-
gage in costly bargaining over many rights to single attributes. The dissipation of value is thus mini-
mized. 
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vising other agents, and committing capital of his own to the venture, thus contributing 
a bond.   
However, there are other reasons why the market may not be able to evaluate 
entrepreneurial services.  For example, Kirzner (1979: 181) argues that “entrepreneur-
ship reveals to the market what the market did not realize was available, or indeed, 
needed at all.”  Casson (1982: 14) takes a more Schumpeterian position, arguing that 
“[t]he entrepreneur believes he is right, while everyone else is wrong.  Thus the essence 
of entrepreneurship is being different — being different because one has a different per-
ception of the situation” (see also Casson 1997).  In this situation, non-contractibility 
arises because “[t]he decisive factors . . . are so largely on the inside of the person mak-
ing the decision that the ‘instances’ are not amenable to objective description and exter-
nal control” (Knight 1921:  251) (see also Foss 1993).  Hence moral hazard is not the only 
important factor underlying non-contractibility.  An agent may be unable to communi-
cate his “vision” of a commercial experiment — a specific way of combining heteroge-
neous capital assets to serve future consumer wants — in such a way that other agents 
can assess its economic implications.  In such a case, he cannot be an employee, but will 
instead start his own firm.  The existence of the firm can thus be explained by a specific 
category of transaction costs, namely, those that close the market for entrepreneurial 
judgment.  
Firms as controlled experiments.  The idea of incomplete markets for judgment 
helps us understand the one-person firm.  However, similar ideas may also be useful 
for understanding the multi-person firm; that is, it may help us understand the emer-
gence of the employment contract.  
Consider again the notion of capital (resource) heterogeneity.  If capital is ho-
mogenous, the coordination of plans is relatively straightforward.  In the real world 
of heterogeneous capital assets, production plans are much more difficult to coordi-
nate.  In the “production function view” of the firm, this problem is sidestepped by 
assuming that the assets controlled by the firm are already in their best uses.  More 
realistically, however, full ex ante knowledge about the optimal sequence of tasks (for 
example) is not likely to exist.21  Given that the relationships among assets are gener-
ally unknown ex ante, some experimentation is necessary.  First, one must isolate the 
system boundaries, that is, where the relevant relationships among assets are most 
likely to be.  Second, the experimental process must be like a controlled experiment 
(or a sequence of such experiments) to isolate the system from outside disturbances.  
Third, there must be some sort of guidance for the experiment.  This may take many 
forms, ranging from centrally provided instructions to negotiated agreements to 
shared understandings of where to begin experimenting, how to avoid overlapping 
experiments, how to revise the experiment in light of past results, and so on.  The 
central problem is how this experimental process is best organized.  Does the need 
                                                 
21 Strikingly, the problem of defining an optimal sequence of tasks in even relatively simple produc-
tion systems may require more calculation capacity than is available in a supercomputer (Galloway 
1996). 
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for experimentation explain the existence of the firm, or can such experimentation be 
organized efficiently through markets?  
In a world of complete knowledge and zero transaction costs, all rights to all 
uses of all assets could be specified in contracts.  By contrast, in a world of heteroge-
neous assets with attributes that are costly to measure and partly unforeseen, com-
plete contracts cannot be drafted.  The resulting set of incomplete contracts may con-
stitute a firm, a process of coordination managed by the entrepreneur’s central direc-
tion.  If relationship-specific assets are involved, the holdup problem described 
above becomes a serious concern.  (Asset specificity may itself be an outcome of an 
experimental process.)  More specifically, as experimental activity provides informa-
tion about how to optimize the system, assets will be increasingly specific in terms of 
time and location.  Temporal and site specificity will tend to increase as assets be-
come more efficiently coordinated.  This provides one rationale for organizing the 
experiments inside firms, though not the only one.  Firms may also be justified by 
problems associated with the dispersion of knowledge across agents.  Production 
systems may exhibit multiple equilibria, and it may not be obvious how to coordi-
nate on a particular equilibrium or even which equilibria are preferred.   
In principle, an experimenting team could hire an outside consultant who 
guides the experimental activity, giving advice on the sequence of actions and asset 
uses, initiating the experiments, drawing the appropriate conclusions from each ex-
periment, determining how these conclusions should influence further experimenta-
tion, and so on.  However, such an arrangement is likely to run into serious bargain-
ing costs.  Under market contracting any team member can veto the advice provided 
by the consultant, and submitting to authority may be the least costly way to organ-
ize the experimental activity.  “Authority” here means that the entrepreneur has the 
right to redefine and reallocate decision rights among team members and to sanction 
team members who do not use their decision rights efficiently.  By possessing these 
rights, entrepreneur-managers can conduct experiments without continuously hav-
ing to renegotiate contracts, saving bargaining and drafting costs.  Such an arrange-
ment then provides a setting for carrying out “controlled” experiments in which the 
entrepreneur-manager changes only some aspects of the relevant tasks to trace the 
effects of specific rearrangements of rights.  Establishing these property rights is tan-
tamount to forming a firm.     
Changes in Firm Boundaries and Entrepreneurial Experimentation 
The theory of firm boundaries is closely related to the theory of entrepreneur-
ship, though it is not usually expressed in this fashion.  Mergers, acquisitions, dives-
titures, and other reorganizations are best viewed as responses to a valuation dis-
crepancy.  Acquisition, for example, occurs when the value of an existing firm’s as-
sets is greater to an outside party than to its current owners.  Put differently, merger 
can be a response to economies of scope, in that the value of the merging firms’ assets 
combined exceeds their joint values separately.  
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New combinations of corporate assets can generate efficiencies by replacing 
poorly performing managers, creating operating synergies, or establishing internal 
capital markets.  Like other business practices that do not conform to textbook mod-
els of competition, mergers, acquisitions, and financial restructurings have long been 
viewed with suspicion by some commentators and regulatory authorities.  However, 
the academic literature clearly suggests that corporate restructurings do, on average, 
create value (Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001).  
Given such benefits, why are many mergers later “reversed” in a divestiture, spin-
off, or carve-out?  Klein and Klein (2001) distinguish between two basic views.  The 
first, which may be termed empire building, holds that entrenched managers make 
acquisitions primarily to increase their own power, prestige or control, producing 
negligible efficiency gains, and that acquisitions by manager-controlled firms are 
likely to be divested ex post.  Most important, because the acquiring firm’s motives 
are suspect, such acquisitions are ex ante inefficient; neutral observers can predict, 
based on pre-merger characteristics, that these mergers are unlikely to be viable over 
time.  (Moreover, by permitting these acquisitions, capital-market participants are 
also guilty of systematic error.)  
A second view, which Klein and Klein (2001) term entrepreneurial market proc-
ess, acknowledges that unprofitable acquisitions may be “mistakes” ex post, but ar-
gues that poor long-term performance does not indicate ex ante inefficiency.  In the 
market-process perspective, a divestiture of previously acquired assets may mean 
simply that profit-seeking entrepreneurs have updated their forecasts of future con-
ditions or otherwise learned from experience.  As Mises (1949: 252) puts it, “the out-
come of action is always uncertain. Action is always speculation.”  Consequently, 
“the real entrepreneur is a speculator, a man eager to utilize his opinion about the 
future structure of the market for business operations promising profits. This specific 
anticipative understanding of the conditions of the uncertain future defies any rules 
and systematization” (p. 585, emphasis added).  
Klein and Klein (2001) discuss empirical evidence that the long-term success 
or failure of corporate acquisitions cannot, in general, be predicted by measures of 
manager control or principal-agent problems.  However, significantly higher rates of 
divestiture tend to follow mergers that occur in a cluster of mergers in the same in-
dustry.  As argued by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 
(2001), and Andrade and Stafford (2004), mergers frequently occur in industry clus-
ters, suggesting that mergers are driven in part by industry-specific factors, such as 
regulatory shocks.  When an industry is regulated, deregulated, or re-regulated, eco-
nomic calculation becomes more difficult, and entrepreneurial activity is hampered.  
It should not be surprising that poor long-term performance is more likely under 
those conditions. 
This notion of entrepreneurial decision-making under uncertainty squares 
with recent theories of acquisitions as a form of experimentation (Mosakowski 1997; 
Boot, Milbourn, and Thakor 1999; Matsusaka, 2001).  In these models, profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs can learn their own capabilities only by trying various combinations of 
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activities, which could include diversifying into new industries. Firms may thus 
make diversifying acquisitions even if they know these acquisitions are likely to be 
reversed in a divestiture.  This process generates information that is useful for revis-
ing entrepreneurial plans, and thus an acquisition strategy may be successful even if 
individual acquisitions are not.  In these cases, the long-term viability of an acquisi-
tion may be systematically related to publicly observable, pre-merger characteristics 
associated with experimentation, but not characteristics associated with managerial 
discretion. 
Internal Organization   
Productive and destructive entrepreneurship.  In much of the entrepreneur-
ship literature, there is a general, though usually implicit claim that all entrepreneu-
rial activity is socially beneficial (Mises 1949; Kirzner 1973).  However, as Baumol 
(1990) and Holcombe (2002) point out, entrepreneurship may be socially harmful if it 
takes the form of rent-seeking, attempting to influence governments (or manage-
ment) to redistribute income but in the process consuming resources and bringing 
about a social loss.  It is therefore necessary to introduce a distinction between pro-
ductive and destructive entrepreneurship.   
When agents expend effort discovering new attributes and taking control over 
these in such a way that joint surplus (net social benefit) is reduced, we shall speak of 
“destructive entrepreneurship.” Thus, discovering new forms of moral hazard 
(Holmström 1982), creating hold-ups (Williamson 1996), and inventing new ways of 
engaging in rent-seeking activities relative to government (Baumol 1990, Holcombe 
2002) are examples of destructive entrepreneurship in the sense that these represent 
the discovery of new attributes that decrease joint surplus.  “Productive entrepre-
neurship” refers to the creation or discovery of new attributes leading to an increase 
in joint surplus.  For example, a franchisee may discover new local tastes that in turn 
may form the basis for new products for the entire chain; an employee may figure 
out better uses of production assets and communicate this to the TQM team of which 
he is a member; a CEO may formulate a new business concept; etc.  In the following 
we sketch how this distinction provides a way of developing an entrepreneurial ap-
proach to internal organization.  Note that we here use the term “entrepreneurship” 
more broadly than before, referring not only to decisions made by resource owners 
(entrepreneurship in the strict sense), but also to decisions made by employees, act-
ing as proxy decision-makers for the resource owners. 
Fundamental tradeoffs in internal organization. The first such problem con-
cerns the control of destructive entrepreneurial activities.  For example, firms may 
delimit employees’ use of telephone and internet services by closely specifying their 
use rights over the relevant assets, instructing them to act in a proper manner to-
wards customers and to exercise care when operating the firm’s equipment, and the 
like.  However, firms are unlikely to succeed entirely in their attempt to curb such 
activities.  One reason for this is the costs of monitoring employees.  Another reason 
is that employees may creatively circumvent constraints; for example, they may in-
vent ways of covering their (mis-)use of the internet. Although firms may know that 
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such destructive entrepreneurship takes place, they may prefer not to try to constrain 
it further.  This is because the various constraints that firms impose on employees 
(or, more generally, that contracting partners impose on each other) to curb destruc-
tive entrepreneurship may have the unwanted side effect that productive entrepre-
neurship is stifled (see Kirzner, 1985).  
More generally, imposing (too many) constraints on employees may reduce 
their propensity to create or discover new attributes of productive assets.  At any 
rate, many firms increasingly appear to operate on the presumption that beneficial 
effects may be produced by reducing constraints on employees in various dimen-
sions. For example, firms such as 3M allocate time to research employees that they 
are basically free to use in almost any way they see fit in the hope that this will pro-
duce serendipitous discoveries.  Many consulting firms do something similar.  Of 
course, industrial firms have long known that employees with many decision rights 
— researchers, for example — must be must be monitored and constrained in differ-
ent, and typically much looser, ways than those employees charged only with rou-
tine tasks.  More broadly, the increasing emphasis on “empowerment” during the 
last few decades reflects a realization that employees derive a benefit from control-
ling aspects of their job situation.  Moreover, the total quality movement emphasizes 
that delegating various rights to employees motivates them to find new ways to in-
crease the mean and reduce the variance of quality (Jensen and Wruck, 1994).  To the 
extent that such activities increase joint surplus, they represent productive entrepre-
neurship. 
Stimulating the productive creation and discovery of new attributes by relax-
ing constraints on employees results in principal-agent relationships that are less 
completely specified.   This is not simply a matter of delegation, or transferring spe-
cific decision rights, but rather giving agents opportunities to exercise their own, of-
ten far reaching, judgments.  However, as we have seen, this also permits potentially 
destructive entrepreneurship.  Managing the tradeoff between productive and de-
structive entrepreneurship thus becomes a critical management task.    
Choosing efficient tradeoffs.  In this context, asset ownership is important be-
cause it gives entrepreneurs the right to define contractual constraints, that is, to 
choose their own preferred tradeoffs.  Briefly stated, ownership allows the employer-
entrepreneur’s preferred degree of contractual incompleteness — and therefore a cer-
tain combination of productive and destructive entrepreneurship — to be imple-
mented at low cost.  This function of ownership is particularly important in a dy-
namic market process, the kind stressed by Knight (in the later chapters of Knight, 
1921) and the Austrians (Hayek, 1948; Kirzner, 1973; Littlechild 1986).  In such a con-
text, an ongoing process of judgmental decision making requires contractual con-
straints to address the changing tradeoffs between productive and destructive entre-
preneurship inside the firm. The power conferred by ownership allows the em-
ployer-entrepreneur to do this at low cost (for a fuller analysis, see Foss and Foss, 
2002).   
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Conclusion 
The theory of entrepreneurship and the economic theory of the firm thus have much 
to learn from each other.  A good theory of entrepreneurship should explain the con-
ditions under which entrepreneurship takes place:  Does the entrepreneur need a 
firm?  We have argued that the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment provides 
the clearest link between entrepreneurship, asset ownership, and economic organiza-
tion.  Similarly, the economic theory of the firm can be improved substantially by 
taking seriously the essential heterogeneity of capital goods and the subsequent need 
for entrepreneurial experimentation. 
Will these insights be incorporated into the economic theory of the firm?  We 
are optimistic, but guardedly so.  Because these concepts lie fundamentally outside 
the standard constrained optimization framework, they are inherently difficult to 
model mathematically.  Modern economists have difficulty appreciating ideas that 
are not expressed in this familiar language.  Indeed, most recent theoretical advances 
in the economic theory of the firm have been developed within the more formal 
framework associated with Grossman, Hart, and Moore, not the more “open” 
framework associated with Williamson.22  Relaxing this constraint may lead to con-
siderable advances in economists’ understanding of the firm. 
                                                 
22 Bajeri and Tadelis (2001) is a prominent exception.  See Foss (1994) for the case that Williamson’s 
work represents an ontologically “open” interpretation of Coase, distinguished in this way from other 
developments of the Coasian tradition. 
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